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 1 
Summary 
There are two main shipping routes between Europe and Asia, among those 
the Southern Route through the Suez Canal is by far the most popular route. 
Due to a decrease in Arctic sea ice, the Northern Sea Route have opened up 
and is expected to become a viable alternative and a possible competitor to 
the Southern Route. The purpose of this essay is to contribute by advising 
ship-owners on what route they should use from a legal perspective. 
 
Both routes have their specific risk, the Southern Route by piracy and the 
Northern Route by harsh weather conditions, ice and floating icebergs. Both 
hazards are such that no matter how much precaution is taken, casualties 
will occur and legal issues on who will be liable for damage and loss will 
arise and be referred to dispute resolution. 
 
This thesis is limited to whether certainty in providing a vessel that the court 
will deem seaworthy differs between the two routes and whether it is a 
relevant aspect to take into account. Seaworthiness derives from the law 
merchant, it is an implied obligation in contracts of affreightment by 
common law, an implied warranty in insurance policies and explicitly 
inserted in most contracts. This thesis will be limited to Hull Insurance 
regulated in s 39(5) Marine Insurance Act 1906 United Kingdome (‘MIA’) 
and Bills of Lading (‘BOL’) mandatory regulated by the Hague and the 
Hague-Visby Rules. 
 
Under a Hull Insurance the insurer will be exempted from liability to 
indemnify the assured for loss if the loss is attributable to unseaworthiness 
to which the assured is privy. Under the Hague and the Hague-Visby Rules 
the ship-owner is obliged to exercise due diligence to make the ship 
seaworthy before and at the beginning of the voyage. If cargo is damaged or 
lost the ship-owner will be liable to the cargo-owner unless he can show that 
he had exercised due diligence to make the ship seaworthy and the damage 
or loss was caused by an act for which the ship-owner is exempted from 
liability. 
 
The applicable test to determine if a vessel is seaworthy and if due diligence 
has been exercised to make the ship seaworthy is whether a prudent ship-
owner in the particular ship-owners place would deem the vessel seaworthy 
and have done what a prudent ship-owner would have done to ensure its  
seaworthiness. The tests are objectively measured against standards and 
knowledge in the shipping industry as a whole. Privy to seaworthiness is a 
subjective test, based on the ship-owners actual, or blind-eye-knowledge. 
 
Courts don´t consider objective standards that are not causative to the 
casualty or are not adequate because the ship-owner should have known that 
the ship needed better standards for the intended adventure or certain factors 
contained risks for defect and needed better surveillance. If there are 
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objective standards that fit the intended voyage and adventure they are taken 
into account and if the ship-owner can show he complies with all standards 
due diligence to seaworthiness is exercised. Objective standards can show 
the ship-owner is not privy to unseaworthiness.  
 
The International Maritime Organization (‘IMO’) guidelines are accepted as 
objective standards, and IMO has issued hazard-specific guidelines both in 
respect of piracy, harsh weather conditions and ice, the Best Management 
Practices for Protection against Somali based Piracy (‘BMP’) and the 
Guidelines for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (‘Polar guidelines’). These 
guidelines are different in respect of form, scope and content. By comparing 
the guidelines in the light of factors courts take into account in assessing 
seaworthiness, it has been concluded that they serve differently in 
seaworthiness assessments in disputes arising under an insurance contract r 
under a BOL.  
 
The Polar guidelines are more detailed and comprehensive and certificates 
are issued to prove compliance in respect of the crew and the vessel and are 
better for the ship-owner in an insurance claim. The BMP are based on real 
accidents, the information is practical and more suitable as objective factors 
for a seaworthiness claim. If a ship-owner complies with these, he will most 
likely have been deemed to have exercised due diligence to seaworthiness. 
 
The insurer bears the burden of proving privy to unseaworthiness whereas 
the ship-owner bears the burden of proving he has exercised due diligence to 
seaworthiness. The claim under the BOL is therefore more difficult to 
succeed and the advice is for the ship-owner to travel the Southern Route. 
 
However, seaworthiness is a very broad term and relates to every aspect of 
the adventure; although seaworthy in relation to the specific hazard it may 
be unseaworthy for a general aspect. Because it is so uncertain and 
impossible to pre-empt what the court will decide, ship-owners should not 
place too great reliance on this aspect in deciding whether to travel the 
Southern Route or the Northern Sea Route.  
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Sammanfattning 
En stor del av världens sjötransporter går mellan Asien och Europa. Idag är 
den södra rutten genom Suez-kanalen populärast, men efter att isen i Arktis 
börjat smälta har den norra rutten öppnats upp som en möjlig utmanare till 
den södra rutten och skeppsägare ställs nu inför ett val. 
 
Sjötransport är en riskfylld verksamhet och både den södra och den norra 
rutten innehåller områden med ökad risk. På den södra rutten består den 
ökade risken av risk för piratattacker. På den norra rutten består den ökade 
risken av is och hårda väderförhållanden. Syftet med denna uppsats är att 
undersöka om rättsliga förhållanden kan inverka på vilken rutt en 
skeppsägare väljer. De valda aspekterna är förutsebarhet i domstolars 
bedömning om ett skepp är sjövärdigt under ett kontrakt att frakta gods styrt 
av Hague och Hague-Visby reglerna samt under ett sjöförsäkringskontrakt 
styrt av den engelska sjöförsäkringslagen.  
 
I tvister under båda kontrakten är frågan om sjövärdighet av stor ekonomisk 
betydelse eftersom den är avgörande för ansvar för lasten och för att 
försäkringsersättning betalas ut. Skeppsägaren är under Hague och Hague-
Visby reglerna skyldig att ha utövat due diligence för att tillse att skeppet är 
sjövärdigt samt under den engelska sjörösäkringslagen att han inte har 
kunskap om att skeppet inte är sjövärdigt.  
 
Standarden för vad som är sjövärdigt skepp, och för vad som krävs för att 
anses ha utövat due diligence för att tillse att skeppet är sjövärdigt sätts 
utifrån vad en erfaren och aktsam skeppsägare i den aktuella situationen 
skulle bedöma som ett sjövärdigt skepp och vad han hade gjort för att tillse 
att det var sjövärdigt. Det är en objektiv standard som sätts utifrån kunskap i 
sjötransportbranschen utifrån information i bland annat IMO-instrument. 
Jurister hävdar att IMO-instrument har inverkan på bedömningen av ett 
skepps sjövärdighet i en kontraktsrättslig tvist, i vart fall om den aktuella 
regeln har till syfte att försäkra att skeppet når sin destination. 
 
Domare verkar dock inte använda IMO-instrument i särskilt stor 
utsträckning. Det beror främst på att informationen de innehåller inte har 
någon direkt relevans för olyckan. Informationen i IMO-instrument är ofta 
för generell och innehåller inte vad som behövs för att avgöra vad som 
orsakade olyckan. Ett certifikat behöver inte innebära att besättningen har 
den kompetens och erfarenhet certifikatet anger eller att fartyget är i det 
skick certifikatet anger. 
 
IMO har publicerat riskspecifika rekommendationer både i förhållande till 
risken för piratattack och att färdas i områden med hårt väder och is. De två 
rekommendationerna har jämförts utifrån dess lämplighet att användas som 
objektiva standarder i domstolars avgörande av ett skepps sjövärdighet och 
följaktligen om en skeppsägare kan vara säkrare på att tillhandahålla ett 
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sjövärdigt skepp på en av rutterna. Om en skeppsägare kan förutse att 
fartyget bedöms sjövärdigt vid val av en rutt, så att han inte blir ansvarig för 
skadat eller förlorat gods och erhåller försäkringsersättning vid skada på 
eller förlust av fartyget, är det ett incitament att välja den rutten. 
 
IMO;s rekommendationer i förhållande till den norra rutten är mer 
omfattande och mer detaljerade men saknar ett helhetsperspektiv. Certifikat 
utges för att bevisa att rekommendationer är uppfyllda. Den norra rutten är 
lämpligast i ett försäkringsmål eftersom skeppsägaren med hjälp av 
certifikaten kan bevisa att han trodde att fartyget var sjövärdigt. 
Rekommendationerna för den södra rutten är mer generella men är baserade 
på vad som har fungerat tidigare och har ett helhetsperspektiv. Om 
rekommendationerna för den södra rutten är följda torde skeppsägaren anses 
ha uppfyllt due diligence för sjövärdighet. 
 
Eftersom skeppsägaren bär bevisbördan i ett mål under Hague och Hague-
Visby reglerna och due-diligence är en objektiv standard i motsats till under 
ett försäkringsmål där försäkringsgivaren bär bevisbördan och måste visa att 
skeppsägaren har kännedom om att skeppet inte är sjövärdigt är det viktigast 
att välja den rutt där due diligence lättast kan bevisas. 
 
Om förutsebarhet i den rättsliga bedömningen av sjövärdighet är avgörande 
bör den södra rutten väljas. Alltför stor tillit bör dock inte denna aspekten 
tillmätas eftersom sjövärdighet är ett vagt begrepp som aldrig är riktigt 
förutsebart. 
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1 Preface 
It is both a pleasure and a curse being able to, or forced to, focus on one 
legal issue for a whole semester. Many assumptions I had proved wrong and 
I gained much new knowledge. 
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2 Introduction  
There are two different routes to choose between when travelling from Asia 
to Europe. The most common one is the route south of Asia and through the 
Suez Canal (‘Southern Route’). Due to reduction of sea-ice in the Arctic, the 
Northern Sea Route has opened up for commercial shipping and is 
anticipated to become a viable alternative and a real competitor to the 
Southern Route.
1 
The aim of this paper is to find out whether legal issues 
may influence ship-owners decision to travel the Southern Route or the 
Northern Sea Route. 
 
Shipping is inherently dangerous and both the Northern Sea Route and the 
Southern Route contain areas of increased risks, the Northern Sea Route in 
form of floating icebergs, and the Southern Route in form of pirate attacks. 
The nature of the hazards are different but both are such that no matter how 
much precautions are taken, casualties with severe consequences to ship, 
cargo and crew can never be completely eliminated.  
 
Unaccountable amounts of legal questions are relevant in determining what 
route to travel. Because the risk of a marine casualty must be acknowledged 
in these areas of increased danger, not being held liable for loss or damage, 
and be certain that the insurance cover potential losses is of major 
importance for the ship-owner. This thesis is limited to certainty in 
providing a vessel that the court will deem seaworthy in a trial arising under 
a Hull Insurance Contract subject to s 39(5) Marine Insurance Act 1906 
United Kingdom (‘MIA’) and a Bill of Lading (‘BOL’) mandatory regulated 
by the Hague Rules
2
 and the Hague-Visby Rules.
3
 
 
Under s 39(5) MIA the insurer will be exempted from liability to indemnify 
the assured for loss if the loss is attributable to unseaworthiness to which the 
assured is privy. Under the Hague- and the Hague-Visby Rules the ship-
owner is obliged to exercise due diligence to make the ship seaworthy 
before and at the beginning of the voyage. The applicable test to determine 
if a vessel is seaworthy is whether a prudent ship-owner in the particular 
ship-owners place would deem the vessel seaworthy. The test is objective 
                                                 
1
Halvor Schöyen, Svein Bråthen The Northern Sea Route versus the Suez Canal: cases 
from bulk shipping, Journal of Transport Geography 19 (2011) 977, 977. 
2
 International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law relating to Bills of 
Lading, 1924. 
3
International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law relating to Bills of 
Lading, 1924 as amended by the ‘Protocol to Amend the International Convention for the 
Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading’ 1968 and further amended 
by the ‘Protocol to Amend the International Convention for the Unification of Certain 
Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading’ 1979. 
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and measured against standards and knowledge in the shipping industry as a 
whole.
4
 
 
The International Maritime Organization (‘IMO’) guidelines are accepted as 
objective standards,
5
 and IMO has issued hazard-specific guidelines both in 
respect of piracy, harsh weather conditions and ice, the Best Management 
Practices for Protection against Somali Based Piracy (’BMP’)6 and the Polar 
Guidelines.
7
 By comparing these guidelines in the light of courts assessment 
of seaworthiness, it can be concluded whether it would be easier to provide 
a vessel that the court will deem seaworthy for one route than for the other. 
If there is a substantive difference, it can be used as a factor to take into 
account together with all other aspects in determining what route to travel.  
 
2.1 Purpose and Questions 
The purpose of this thesis is to contribute to the ship-owners decision to 
travel the Southern Route or the Northern Sea Route from a legal 
perspective. It has been limited to certainty in providing a vessel the court 
will deem seaworthy. 
 
In order to complete the purpose, the following questions will be dealt with: 
 
 Is certainty in providing a vessel the court will deem seaworthy a 
relevant aspect to take into account in deciding what route to travel? 
 Are there different levels of certainty in providing a vessel the court 
will deem seaworthy if travelling the Southern Route or the Northern 
Sea Route? 
2.2 Limitation 
The focal point of this thesis is courts assessment of seaworthiness under 
disputes arising from BOL and Hull Insurance contracts, objective factors 
court’s take into account in seaworthiness assessments and the BMP and the 
Polar guidelines. This thesis is intended to provide a practical advice for 
ship-owners, a complete advice would need assessment of an unaccountable 
amount of legal issues but this is not possible due to the scope of this paper. 
Throughout, limitations have been made to only assess those aspects 
relevant for advice suitable for ship-owners. 
 
                                                 
4Professor Hannu Honka ‘Owners Duties and Liability in Chartering Relating to the ISM 
Code’ in Johan Schelin (eds) Modern Law of Charterparties (Jure Forlag, 2003) Chap 3, 
110, 114.   
5
Sir Bernard Eder et al, Scrutton on Charterparties and Bills of Lading (Sweet & Maxwell 
22
nd
 ed, 2011)118 [7.20]. 
6
Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Waters Off the Coast of Somalia IMO 
MSC.1/Circ.1339 (14 September 2011). 
7
 Guidelines for Ships Operating in Polar Waters IMO A 26/Res.1024 (18 January 2010). 
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BOL and Hull Insurance are chosen because they are both of great monetary 
value and necessary for a choice to be made. According to ship-owners, the 
biggest impediments against travelling the Northern Sea Route are 
availability of an affordable insurance and cargo to carry.
8 
Due diligence to 
seaworthiness and privy to unseaworthiness relates to persons that can be 
viewed as alter egos of the company in case the ship is owned by a 
company.
9
 This paper will not deal with those issues but assume there is 
only one ship-owner. 
 
Seaworthiness includes all aspects of the equipage including the ship, 
equipment, crew and documentation.
10
 It relates to the intended voyage with 
the particular cargo and cargoworthiness is a sub-part of seaworthiness thus 
containing some particular issues.
11 
This paper is limited to seaworthiness in 
respect of the crew, equipment and the vessel. Documentation will not be 
regarded as it is determined by national rules. Cargoworthiness will not be 
considered because care of cargo is more dependent on the particular cargo 
than the chosen route.
12
 
 
Perils of the sea is another term of importance under BOL and Hull 
Insurance because only those perils insured against will be covered and 
perils of the sea is one of the immunities for the ship-owner obligations 
under the Hague and the Hague-Visby Rules. For insurance it depends on 
the terms in the contract but it is discussed whether it falls under any of the 
immunities under the Hague and the Hague-Visby Rules.
13
 Perils is 
interrelated to seaworthiness because a seaworthy vessel is a vessel that can 
meet the expected perils of the voyage, there are also discrepancy in 
whether piracy can be related to unseaworthiness because some regard it as 
an extraneous peril.
14 
It will be assumed that piracy is a peril relevant in 
assessing seaworthiness. There are no indications that ice and harsh weather 
is not a peril of the sea or peril relevant in a seaworthiness assessment. 
 
Objective standards in assessing seaworthiness include information 
available in the shipping industry as a whole. In the descriptive part, all 
kinds of objective standards will be considered but the analysis will be 
limited to IMO instruments due to the limited scope of this thesis. Issues of 
private guards will not be considered although mentioned in the BMP. It is 
not comparable to other aspects of seaworthiness because it includes 
                                                 
8
 Diana L. Torrens, Marine Insurance for the Northern Sea Route - Pilot Study, Summary of 
Working Paper No. 1-1994,1 August 2013 <http://www.fni.no/>. 
9
 Dr Susan Hodges ‘The Quest for Seaworthiness: A Study of US and English Law of 
Marine Insurance Contracts’ in Prof. D. Rhidian Thomas(eds) The Modern Law of Marine 
Insurance (Informa, 2002) vol 2, 199, 213 [6.31]. 
10
 Scrutton, above n 5, 119-120 [7.21-7.23]. 
11
Ibid 119[7.21]. 
12
 Ibid. 
13
 Giulia Argano Pirates…A Charterers´Peril of the Sea Southampton Student Law Review 
[2011] vol 1, 169, 174. 
14
Ibid 186. 
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questions of state sovereignty and plausible illegal acts.
15
 It will also be 
limited to deter the accident from happening and not how crew-members 
can be saved due to not being relevant under a BOL and due to the limited 
scope of this paper. 
 
To be relevant for as many ship-owners as possible, the thesis will take an 
international approach and refer to international conventions and agreements 
instead of those instruments implemented in national law. International 
agreements can be implemented differently in different countries; some 
countries include additional requirements or change the text. Using the 
international source will surely provide the international uniform standard.  
 
When there are no international sources available, mainly British sources 
will be used but also other common law jurisdictions where British law 
maintain great impact will be used. United Kingdom has been chosen 
because of its pivotal role in the shipping community. United Kingdom has 
always had a pivotal role in international trade, shipping and maritime law 
and still has major influence and is used as governing law in many shipping 
contracts worldwide. Marine Insurance is not governed by international 
conventions and the United Kingdom Marine Insurance Act 1906 will be 
used. Case-law is also national and most cases assessed are from the United 
Kingdom.  
 
There are four conventions imposing mandatory rules for BOL, the Hague 
Rules, the Hague-Visby Rules, the Hamburg Convention
16
 and the 
Rotterdam Rules.
17 
The Hamburg Rules and the Rotterdam Rules were 
introduced later with an aim to modernise the Hague-Visby Rules but have 
failed to gain members. Due to its popularity in terms of member states, this 
paper will be limited to the Hague and the Hague-Visby Rules.
18
 
2.3 Methodology and Disposition 
This thesis is built up by four parts. The first part (chapter three) introduces 
the agreements, IMO and the hazards in order to familiarize the reader with 
the topic. The descriptive part (chapter four and five), describes 
seaworthiness under a BOL and an insurance contract and how it has been 
applied in court. The descriptive part ends with a conclusion on 
seaworthiness and a suggestion on what objective standards court will take 
into account. The third part (chapter six and seven) is case-based analytical. 
The case is whether the BMP and the Polar guidelines are introduced, 
compared and analysed in light of the findings from the descriptive part. 
Lastly the conclusion is presented advising and explaining if ship-owners 
                                                 
15
 Interim Guidance to Private Maritime Security Companies providing privately 
contracted armed security personnel on board ships in the high risk area IMO 
MSC.1/Circ.1443, 25 May 2012, 1. 
16
 United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, 1978. 
17
 United Nations Convention of the Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea 2009. 
18
William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims (Thomson Carswell, 4
th
 ed, 2008) vol 1, 6. 
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should take certainty in providing a seaworthy vessel into account when 
determining whether they should travel the Southern Route or the Northern 
Sea Route.  
 
For the descriptive part (chapters four to five) the traditional legal method is 
used, which means de lege lata is discovered by reading and analysing laws, 
international conventions, contracts, case-law and authority.  
 
Great emphasis is placed on case-law for two reasons. Firstly, maritime law 
is rooted in the law merchandise and is developed primarily by case-law.
19 
Secondly, seaworthiness is a relative term dependent on the facts in each 
case because each situation cannot be pre-empted and written down in 
statutes case-law is the most appropriate source. Analogy is used between 
precedents on the Hague and the Hague-Visby Rules and the Marine 
Insurance Act 1906 as it is accepted that seaworthiness has the same 
meaning in both cases.
20
 
 
In the case-based and analytical part, (chapter five to seven) the BMP and 
the Polar guidelines will be presented and compared followed by an analysis 
on whether a court will take into account those guidelines in a plausible 
future assessment of seaworthiness. The aim is to give a practical advice on 
hypothetical situations. 
 
The concluding part will present an advice for ship-owners whether they 
should use certainty on providing a vessel deemed seaworthy by court as an 
aspect in their decision to take the Southern Route or the Northern Sea 
Route and which one they should choose. The conclusion will be based on 
information from the previous sections.  
2.4 Terminology 
For ease of understanding, the following subjects will be referred to; ship-
owner, cargo-owner, insurer and assured. In reality, the subject entering into 
a BOL may not be the real ship-owner and cargo-owner. In this paper, ship-
owner refers to the party in charge of the management of the vessel and 
cargo-owner the ship-owners counterpart in a contract of affreightment. For 
insurance contracts, the insurer is the party providing insurance and assured 
the party buying insurance. The assured will be referred to both as ship-
owner and assured. 
 
All people working on board ships, including the master, will be referred to 
as crew or crew-members unless there is a particular reason for identifying 
their position. 
                                                 
19
John F Wilson, Carriage of Goods by Sea (Pearson, 7
th
 ed, 2010) 9. 
20
 Great China Metal Industries Co Ltd v Malaysian International Shipping Corp Berhad 
(1998) 196 CLR 161, 174 [27]-[31]. 
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3 Hazards, Agreements and 
IMO 
3.1 Agreements 
The agreements that will be discussed in this paper are Hull Insurance 
Contracts and Bills of Lading (‘BOL’). 
3.2 Hull Insurance 
Under a marine insurance contract, the insurer undertakes to indemnify the 
assured for perils insured against, in exchange for a premium. Contracts can 
be drafted ad hoc, or standard contracts provided by organisations can be 
used. Organisations provide both full contracts and voyage specific clauses 
that can be implemented into the full contracts. 
 
In the United Kingdom, the Marine Insurance Act 1906 (hereafter ‘MIA’) 
governs marine insurance contracts. Marine insurance contracts are defined 
as contracts where the insurer undertakes to indemnify the assured against 
losses incident to marine adventures.
21
  MIA is not mandatory and will be 
overridden when the parties’ agreement expressly provides other terms.22 
Insurance contracts must be embodied in policies in accordance with MIA,
23
 
referred to as hull policies. Within MIA there are time and voyage policies. 
Ships are normally insured under time policies,
24 
where the subject-matter is 
insured for a definite period of time.
25
 
3.3 Bill of Lading 
BOL are evidence of contracts between cargo-owners and ship-owners 
where the ship-owner undertakes to carry the cargo from one port to 
another. The BOL has three functions; it is a receipt for goods shipped, 
evidence of the contract of carriage and a document of the right to 
possession of the goods.
26
 By signing the BOL, the master, as agent for the 
ship-owner, acknowledges that said cargo is placed on board. The right to 
possession of the goods is important as the BOL can be traded multiple 
times during the voyage and the ship-owner must discharge the goods to the 
party showing the BOL to ensure it is delivered to the right person.
27
 
 
                                                 
21
 s 1 Marine Insurance Act United Kingdom 1906. 
22
Martin Davies, Anthony Dickey, Shipping Law (Thomson Reuters, 3
rd
 ed, 2004) 507-509. 
23
 s 22 Marine Insurance Act United Kingdom 1906. 
24
 Davies and Dickey, above n 22, 501. 
25
 s 25 Marine Insurance Act United Kingdom 1906. 
26
Wilson, above n 19, 118,129, 132. 
27
Wilson, above n 19, 132-133. 
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BOL are subject to mandatory rules introduced by International 
Conventions, the ones discussed in this paper are the Hague Rules and the 
Hague-Visby Rules. Mandatory rules were introduced to mitigate the power 
discrepancy between ship-owners and cargo owners. Before the introduction 
of mandatory rules the ship-owners undertook to carry the cargo but didn´t 
accept any liability if it was lost or damaged.
28
 The Hague and the Hague-
Visby Rules consist broadly of two parts, one providing minimum 
obligations on the ship-owner and the other providing maximum immunities 
from such obligations. The ship-owners primer obligations are to provide a 
seaworthy ship and carry the goods from loading to discharging port.
29
 
3.4 IMO 
The International Maritime Organization, (‘IMO’) is United Nations 
specialised agency for marine matters. Its main objective is to implement 
uniform and universal standards regarding maritime safety and prevention 
of marine pollution.
30  
 
 
Rules and recommendations are both directed to governments in exercising 
their state function and upon legal subjects in the marine industry. IMO 
instruments must be adopted into national legislation to gain effect for 
private subjects. Member states are responsible to ensure that ships sailing 
under their flag comply with the IMO instruments they have adopted into 
national rules. IMO instruments give certificates as proof of compliance, 
each member state is responsible for issuing certificates.
31 
 
 
IMO membership is restricted to states but international non-governmental 
organisations can obtain consultative status. IMO also cooperate with 
industry groups and intergovernmental organisations.
32
 
3.5 Hazards 
Piracy-attacks off the coast of Somalia is the major hazard travelling the 
Southern Route, and harsh weather conditions, ice and floating icebergs are 
the greatest dangers travelling the Northern Sea Route. The hazards are 
different in nature, pirate attacks is exercised by humans whereas harsh 
weather, ice and floating icebergs are a natural part of the Northern Sea 
Route. Furthermore, some ice and storms are expected in the Polar regions, 
the dangers arise when it becomes too much, whereas piracy never occurs in 
small scale, it is either full attack or nothing.  
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3.6 Piracy 
A piracy attack starts with the pirates coming up close to the vessel, using 
small fire arms mainly against the bridge and accommodation area in order 
to force the vessel to reduce speed and to enable pirates to board. Boarding 
normally occurs by climbing up the shipside by a longweight ladder or 
rope.
33 
Although difficult, and intimidating, it is possible to evade pirate 
attacks.
34
 Pirates change their tactics when their victims have invented 
strong enough combating systems. Previously most pirate attacks occurred 
close to shore, after the use of navy vessels and ships travelling in convoy in 
that area, attacks now more often occur further out from shore.
35
 
3.7 Harsh Weather Conditions and Ice 
Low temperatures can negatively affect equipments functionality. Floating 
icebergs and ice-contact constitutes damage ship-hull, machinery and 
rudder, making vessels un-manoeuvrable or sink.
36
 Vessels with ice-
breaking ability travel through ice, the major hazard for them is if the ice 
suddenly becomes too thick restricting the vessel from proceeding or 
turning back. However, as oppose to piracy, arctic hazards are consistent, 
ice conditions are changing rapidly but it is an event by nature that is 
possible to predict most times with adequate information. 
                                                 
33
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4 Seaworthiness 
Modern maritime law derives from the law merchant that governed in the 
advent of shipping and international trade. Seaworthiness is one obligation 
developed then that is still in effect today. Under common law, the 
obligation of providing a seaworthy vessel is absolute and automatically 
implemented in each contract of affreightment.
37
 The obligation is inserted 
in the Hague and the Hague-Visby Rules but the level of the obligation has 
decreased to due diligence to seaworthiness.
38
 Insurance contracts do not 
contain obligations as such but s 39(5) MIA states that the insurer is not 
liable for loss attributable to unseaworthiness for which the insurer is privy. 
 
Before looking into the seaworthiness obligations under the contracts, an 
attempt to define a seaworthy vessel will follow. This definition is relevant 
for all types of contracts where seaworthiness is prevalent. As commonly 
done by courts, precedents from trials under different contracts will be 
considered.
39
 
4.1 Definition of Seaworthiness 
There is no abstract definition of what constitutes a vessel seaworthy but 
there are many definitions saying more or less the same thing. One 
definition is that the ship is ‘fit to meet and undergo the perils of sea and 
other incidental risks to which of necessity she must be exposed in the 
course of a voyage.’40 Another one is: ´the vessel must have the degree of 
fitness which an ordinary careful owner would require his vessel to have at 
the commencement of her voyage having regard to all the probable 
circumstances of it.’41 Seaworthiness is a very broad concept and ‘embraces 
obligations with respect to every part of the hull and machinery, stores and 
equipment and the crew itself.’ 42 
 
Tetley provides a list of examples that makes the vessel seaworthy; tight 
hull and hatches, proper system of pumps, valves, boilers and engines, that 
it must be equipped with up-to-date charts, that equipment is properly 
labelled and that it is supplied with enough bunkers.
43
 Crew competence is 
                                                 
37
Wilson, above n 19, 9. 
38
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distinguished from mere negligence,
44
 and includes lack of ability or 
training, lack of knowledge in relation to a particular vessel, lack of will or 
inclination, habits and/or characteristics which render a seaman not suitable 
for his role on board the vessel and temporary incapacity, e.g., illness.
45
  
 
All these aspects are interrelated, seaworthiness, ‘connotes an inherent 
quality with which the unit comprising vessel and cargo is invested. So long 
as that unit maintains a constant character, that quality remains inherent in 
it.’46 In Hongkong Fir, the engine was old and needed to be maintained by 
competent and adequate engine staff. Due to not being maintained properly 
the engine subsequently broke down and the vessel was deemed 
unseaworthy for supplying inadequate crew, not for the engines condition.
47
  
 
Suggestions are made that if a casualty occurs, the vessel is unseaworthy 
because it is evidently not fit to meet perils of the sea, but the obligation 
does not require an accident-free ship,
48
 ‘an incompetent officer is more 
likely to contribute to the causes of a collision than a competent officer, but 
it does not follow that if a ship is in collision her master and chief-officer 
were not competent to hold their positions.’49 Deficiencies not impacting a 
vessels safety are irrelevant.
50
  
 
Seaworthiness is an objective standard, if the ship-owner has done his best 
to make the ship fit doesn´t mean it is seaworthy.
 51
 The applicable test is: 
‘Would a reasonably prudent owner, knowing the relevant facts, have 
allowed this vessel to put to sea…’52 A prudent ship-owner is one from the 
industry, his knowledge is based on objective standards being those of the 
shipping community as a whole.
53
 
 
Lydia Flag
54
 was damaged after losing its rudder during voyage. The loss 
was due to negligence by repair personnel but how the defect manifested 
itself and nature of negligence was not clear. Mr. Justice Moore-Bick held 
‘In this case it is difficult to see precisely what the nature of deficiency was. 
It may have been which would have led to the loss of the rudder in a very 
short time. On the other hand it may have been one which would inevitably 
not lead to the loss of the rudder for some considerable time. If it were the 
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latter, then, as it seems to me, the vessel would not by any means 
necessarily be unseaworthy at the time when this policy incepted.’ 55 
 
In addition to being relative to the adventure, seaworthiness changes over 
time following advance in shipbuilding industry and increased knowledge 
on shipping in general. Since the late 20
th
 century when it was 
acknowledged that human error caused most marine casualties, crew 
incompetence has increased in seaworthiness claims.
56
  
 
A vessel is hence seaworthy if it is fit for the intended adventure based on 
the knowledge of the prudent ship-owner. The concept was well 
summarized in Bunga Seroja, ‘The question of seaworthiness, then, may 
require consideration of many and varied matters.’57 
4.2 Seaworthiness under s 39(5) MIA 
Under an insurance contract, the insurer is obliged to indemnify the ship-
owner for loss in accordance with the contract. The ship-owner is not 
obliged to perform anything and is hence not obliged to provide a seaworthy 
vessel. Seaworthiness is relevant because it relieves the insurer from 
liability to pay insurance if the ship is unseaworthy with privy of the ship-
owner. Seaworthiness is dealt with in section 39(5) MIA stating: 
 
In a time policy there is no implied warranty that the ship shall be seaworthy at any 
stage of the adventure, but where, with the privity of the assured, the ship is sent to sea 
in an unseaworthy state, the insurer is not liable for any loss attributable to 
unseaworthiness. 
 
Before the question of seaworthiness arises, the ship-owner must show that 
the loss was proximately caused by a peril insured against.
58
 If the 
unseaworthiness is the only cause the ship-owner will not be indemnified 
because unseaworthiness is not a peril insured against.
59
 If the casualty is 
proximately caused by a peril insured against and unseaworthiness is within 
the chain of causation the insurer is not exempted from liability for the 
whole loss, only the part attributable to the unseaworthiness.
60
 
 
Privy relates to unseaworthiness, not facts leading to unseaworthiness. In 
other words, it is not sufficient to show the ship-owner is privy to a ship-
owners lack of knowledge, it must be shown that the ship-owner knows a 
crew-member lacks knowledge on a particular fact, the ship-owner must 
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also know that lack of knowledge of the particular fact renders the vessel 
unseaworthy.
61
 
 
The insurer bears the burden of proving unseaworthiness, that the ship-
owner is privy to such unseaworthiness and that there is a loss attributable to 
it. 
4.3 Privity 
Privity means knowledge or a state of mind by the law recognised 
equivalent to knowledge, so called blind eyed knowledge.
62
 Blind eye 
knowledge arises when someone suspects something, firmly grounded and 
targeted on specific facts, and refrain from asking in order not to gain actual 
knowledge.
63
 Blind-eye knowledge has also been referred to as Nelsonian 
knowledge referring to the following explanation by Lord Scott.
64
 ‘Nelson 
at the battle of Copenhagen made a deliberate decision to place the telescope 
to his blind eye in order to avoid seeing what he knew he would see if he 
placed it to his good eye.’65 Contrary to due diligence, privity attributes to 
knowledge and is not synonymous to any form of fault.
66
 
 
That privy is not measured against objective standards was clarified in the 
Star Sea. The insurer argued that the ship-owner was privy to 
unseaworthiness for failing to address defects despite two ships in the same 
fleet had previously been lost due to similar deficiencies.
67
 It was 
acknowledged that the assured may had acted negligently to a high degree in 
not concluding or suspecting from previous accidents that all vessels might 
have the same defects, but not that the ship-owner had blind-eye 
knowledge.
68
 ‘Blind-eye knowledge cannot be based on inadequacy of 
response to earlier fires or what was learnt by them but must be based upon 
facts of the ship and casualty subject to dispute.’69 
 
In order to establish privy, the ship-owner should be asked why he didn´t 
enquire about a fact. If the answer is that the ship-owner didn´t ask because 
he didn´t want to know then it is privy. If the answer is that he was lazy then 
the ship-owner is not privy. Similarly, an omission to take precaution 
against the ship possibly being unseaworthy does not amount to privy.
70
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4.4 Seaworthiness under the Hague and 
the Hague-Visby Rules 
In entering into a BOL, the ship-owner undertakes to carry the cargo-owners 
cargo from loading port to discharge port. If the goods are lost or damaged 
on the way, the ship-owner will be liable for the loss or damage unless he 
can rely on one of the exemptions from liability found in article IV. In order 
to raise a claim, the cargo-owner must show that the ship-owner damaged 
the cargo, which is done by showing that the goods were in a good condition 
when loaded and in a bad condition when discharged.
71
 The relevant rules in 
the Hague and the Hague-Visby Rules are: 
 
Article III Rule 1 
The carrier shall be bound before and at the beginning of the voyage to exercise due 
diligence to:  
(a) Make the ship seaworthy;  
(b) Properly man, equip and supply the ship;  
(c) Make the holds, refrigerating and cool chambers, and all other parts of the ship in 
which goods are carried, fit and safe for their reception, carriage and preservation. 
 
Article IV Rule 1 
Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be liable for loss or damage arising or resulting 
from unseaworthiness unless caused by want of due diligence on the part of the carrier 
to make the ship seaworthy, and to secure that the ship is properly manned, equipped 
and supplied, and to make the holds, refrigerating and cool chambers and all other parts 
of the ship in which goods are carried fit and safe for their reception, carriage and 
preservation in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article III. Whenever 
loss or damage has resulted from unseaworthiness the burden of proving the exercise of 
due diligence shall be on the carrier or other person claiming exemption under this 
article. 
4.5 Obligations and Immunities 
The Hague-Visby Rules contain one part imposing minimum-obligations on 
the ship-owner and one containing maximum immunities from those 
obligations. Seaworthiness is included in both.
72
 Due to being an obligation 
and immunity, authority suggest different ways of interpreting it with 
relevance for the burden of proof under a claim were unseaworthiness is 
alleged. 
 
Due diligence to seaworthiness is viewed as an overriding obligation. This 
conclusion was drawn after comparing article III rule 1 and 2. Article III 
rule 2 imposes obligations but includes ‘subject to the exemptions in article 
IV’ and are hence explicitly subject to immunities. Rule 1, the 
seaworthiness obligation on the other hand doesn´t refer to any immunities 
at all.
 73
 Based on it being an overriding obligation, it is concluded that after 
a cargo-owner shows the cargo was in good order in and bad order out, the 
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ship-owner must show that he has exercised due diligence to seaworthiness 
before he can rely on any immunities from liability.
74
 
 
That the ship-owner should bear the burden of proof of due diligence to 
seaworthiness is supported by the general principle that the party closest to 
the facts bears the burden of proving it.
75
 Supporters for a literal 
interpretation argue the second limb of article IV rule 1 ‘Whenever loss or 
damage has resulted from unseaworthiness the burden of proving the 
exercise of due diligence shall be on the carrier or other person claiming 
exemption under this article,’ provides that the cargo-owner bears the 
burden of proving unseaworthiness before the ship-owner must show he 
exercised due diligence to make the ship seaworthy.
 
It is recognized that it is 
hard for the cargo-owner to adduce sufficient evidence that the ship is 
unseaworthy, the courts acknowledge this by accepting as prima facie 
evidence that the damage shows that it could have been caused by 
unseaworthiness.
76
 
 
In practice both parties will adduce evidence for their position but the 
burden of proof is of relevance in the outcome of a claim where not 
sufficient evidence is adduced to show what caused the casualty. If the ship-
owner has a positive obligation of proving due diligence to seaworthiness he 
will be held liable. If the cargo-owner must show unseaworthiness, the ship-
owner will be relieved liability. Regardless, because the courts let cargo-
owners easily get away with prima facie evidence of unseaworthiness, in 
effect the burden is often with the ship-owner. 
77
 
4.6 Due Diligence 
Due diligence is a non-delegable obligation and the ship-owner is 
responsible that whoever he employs perform a diligent job. If a deficiency 
amounting to unseaworthiness is caused by negligence by repair personnel, 
or surveyed by a classification society that says it is in a good condition, he 
cannot blame them if the vessel is later found unseaworthy by their 
negligence. This applies no matter how experienced the surveyor is.
78
 There 
is thus a time-limitation, the ship-owner is not liable for defects from before 
he acquired the vessel, as long as the defects should have been found when 
taking over the vessel.
79
 In effect, this only applies to latent defects in the 
construction of the vessel.
80
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Courts interpret due diligence similar to the common law duty of care which 
is a negligence standard.
81
 In other words, the ship-owner must diligently 
ensure the vessel is seaworthy. Similar to seaworthiness, due diligence is 
relative and change over time, it is not absolute and the ship-owner is not 
expected to detect all faults.
82
 The applicable test is ‘whether a reasonable 
man in the shoes of the defendant, with the skill and knowledge which the 
defendant had or ought to have had, would have taken those extra 
precautions’.83 Judges stresses that due diligence is based upon ‘its own 
merits and upon its own facts,’ 84 meanwhile commentators argue that by 
introducing the ISM Code, IMO has established adequate standards a ship-
owner must comply with in order to prove due diligence have been 
exercised.
85
 The ISM Code will be further discussed below in section 4.4.1. 
 
Due diligence is not to with hindsight see that extra precautions could have 
been taken but to consider what other skilled men would do.
86
 A prudent 
ship-owner is one that has ‘Exercised all reasonable skill and care to ensure 
the vessel was seaworthy…the test to be objective, namely to be measured 
by the standards of reasonable ship-owner, taking into account international 
standards and the particular circumstances of the problem in hand.’87 
 
Due diligence and seaworthiness overlap and are more clear read together. 
The ship-owner can either first establish what a prudent ship-owner ought to 
do to maintain the vessel seaworthy and then apply that to seaworthiness 
standards in order to find out what he must detect. Or, the other way around, 
to first establish what a seaworthy ship is then decide what must be done to 
ensure it. The result should be the same. 
4.7 Seaworthiness under s 39(5) MIA and 
the Hague and the Hague-Visby Rules 
After one marine casualty, it can be that the ship-owner is held liable under 
the BOL for having failed to exercise due diligence to seaworthiness but the 
insurer will not be relieved from liability because the ship-owner is not held 
privy to the unseaworthiness.  
 
Due diligence to seaworthiness is an obligation under the BOL, whereas 
under a hull policy unseaworthiness with the privy of the assured exempts 
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the insurer from liability to indemnify the ship-owner. What renders a vessel 
unseaworthy is similar, but that is how far the similarities go.  
 
Under a BOL the ship-owner must prove he exercised due diligence to 
seaworthiness before he can claim exemption from liability under one of the 
immunities in the Hague and the Hague-Visby Rules. In an insurance claim, 
the ship-owner will get indemnity for the loss unless the insurer can show 
that the loss was caused by unseaworthiness for which the ship-owner was 
privy.  
 
There are no conditions determined in law that determines that a vessel is 
seaworthy, the applicable test is whether a prudent ship-owner in the actual 
ship-owners place would deem it as seaworthy. A prudent ship-owner is 
measured against knowledge in the shipping community as a whole. 
 
Due diligence is also an objective test measured against the shipping 
community as a whole. It is a non-delegable duty so the ship-owner cannot 
rely on others if they don´t come up to the standards of a prudent ship-
owner. Privy to unseaworthiness is a subjective standard and the ship-owner 
can rely on information from others.  
4.8 Objective Standards 
The same objective standards apply to seaworthiness and due diligence to 
seaworthiness, the shipping community as a whole. Shipping community as 
a whole ranges from well-known information to published studies,
88
 
standards provided by classification societies and IMO.
89
 
 
Only because information is written down doesn´t mean it is an objective 
standard adequate for a seaworthiness or due diligence assessment. Only 
those standards that are reasonable and relevant for safe transport of the 
cargo will be considered. A ship was allegedly unseaworthy for having 
breached national legislation in not supplying the ship with required 
numbers of certified crew.
90
 Mr Justice Willmer stated: 
 
I suppose, the owners, could be subjected to criminal proceedings. But I am not 
concerned with the penal consequences of this breach of the relevant Government 
legislation. What I am concerned with is the question whether the plaintiffs has satisfied 
me that the collision and consequent damage happened without their privity.
91
 
 
Increased knowledge on shipping in general and advances of science means 
new standards to seaworthiness and due diligence arise all the time.
92
 It is 
suggested that new technology must be introduced when the ship is on 
repair but not that it must be repaired when new technology is introduced.
93
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It is argued that setting out extreme standards, as may be the case with the 
ISM Code requiring the ship-owner inter alia to ensure compliance with all 
codes, regulations and industry practices, will increase due diligence to 
seaworthiness substantially.
 94
 
 
New standards arise with each casualty and ship-owners must pay attention. 
First time a casualty occurs, the ship-owner is relieved from liability, but 
after a reasonable time, ship-owners must insure the same casualty doesn´t 
happen to their ship.
95
  
 
Objective standards should be followed if they are reasonable and relevant 
for the claim. The ship-owner must respond to novelties in the industry and 
adopt new measures within a reasonable time.  
 
4.9 IMO as a provider of Objective 
Standards 
It is accepted that IMO is included in the shipping industry as a whole and 
that IMO instruments provide an objective yardstick to the extent it aims to 
protect the safety of the vessel.
96
 However, what the court is after is 
applicable standard, not that a particular certificate is obtained.
 97
 The status 
of the IMO instrument is also considered, it is argued that only Conventions 
provide determinative guidelines and that other recommendations may be 
considered if relevant.
98
  
 
IMO instruments applicability in determining liability between private 
parties have been especially discussed in relation to the ISM Code. The ISM 
Code requires ship-owners to exercise risk assessment and provide a safety 
management system to inter alia establish safeguards to all identified risks, 
to continuously improve safety management skills of personnel and ensure 
compliance with mandatory rules and regulations.
99
 When introduced it was 
appreciated for setting ‘… a practical rather than legal standard of what the 
reasonable ship-owner ought to do…’100 And although not always 
mentioned, it is and has been acknowledged by courts in assessing due 
diligence to seaworthiness.
101
 
 
IMO instruments are directed to certain vessels, but courts have considered 
the ISM Code to cases even before it had come in effect but it was well-
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known what it demanded. This indicates that the information it provides is 
more important than who it applies to. An arbitral tribunal held that a ship-
owner should have been inspired by provisions in the ISM Code requiring 
specific instructions to crew-members in cargo-handling although the Code 
was not yet in effect.
102
 In the Eurasian dream, not having complied with 
the requirements in the ISM-Code although not being in effect for the vessel 
was considered in the courts finding that the ship-owner had not exercised 
due diligence to seaworthiness.
103
 
 
Based primarily on how the ISM Code has been acknowledged by courts. 
IMO instruments are relevant objective standards in seaworthiness claims 
but the information is more important than their status in public law. ‘The 
ISM Code was not developed, and was never intended to be a tool for 
lawyers and the courts to determine issues of liability...these are 
byproducts!’104 With this quote in mind, it should be possible for a ship-
owner to acknowledge what IMO instruments he should address and which 
are not relevant for the vessel regardless of what he is required to comply 
with according to public law.  
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5 Seaworthiness in Case-law 
What is legally required by a ship-owner is clear. He must have exercised 
due diligence to seaworthiness before and at the beginning of the voyage 
under a BOL and not being privy to seaworthiness under a hull-policy. The 
difficulty is to anticipate how judges will apply law to facts. This part will 
deal with what factors a judge actually takes into account and why. In an 
attempt to not make the information accessible, it has been divided between 
crew-competence and vessel/equipment and unseaworthiness and due 
diligence and privy. 
5.1 Crew-competence 
In assessing crew-competence, courts have placed reliance on certificates, 
and experience. That a ship-owner is certified indicates that the crew-
member is competent, but it is not a determinative factor. Similarly, that a 
crew-member is uncertified doesn´t render him incompetent. Contrary to 
certificates, relevant experience undoubtedly indicates competence and lack 
of experience incompetence. 
 
The Torepo grounded whilst under pilotage in a difficult passage and a 
lookout that was not certified failed to report a lantern.
105
 Justice David 
Steel held that uncertification was immaterial because the requirements in 
the certification didn´t directly deal with the look-out´s duties and having 
the knowledge acquired by the certificate wouldn´t had made him more 
competent to report the lantern.
106
 The Empire Jamaica collided with 
another vessel, the other vessel caused the collision but minor negligence 
was admitted by the Empire Jamaica‘s uncertified officer.107 Justice 
Willmer acknowledged that the fact that a crew-member is uncertified 
doesn´t mean he is incompetent, and competence was shown by the officer 
having long experience at sea.
108
 
 
The vessel, Marina Iris,
 
 sank and the crew perished.
109
 Incompetence was 
determined on the bases that the crew lacked certificates as well as relevant 
experience for the voyage and there was no reliable evidence showing 
competence.
110
  In the Eurasean Dream a car-carrier, was lost by fire during 
unloading of cars while part of the cargo was still on-board.
111
 It started 
with a small fire that spread, the crew-members made several mistakes and 
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failed to stop it, the master failed to use the CO2 fire-fighting system 
correctly. The judge found the master and crew-members incompetent for 
lacking ship and cargo specific knowledge.
112
 
 
The Makedonia, broke down mid-Atlantic due to not having enough fuel, 
after a large amount of the carried fuel was contaminated. The engine-
officers inappropriate fuel, fresh water and fuel-equipment handling on 
numerous occasions had contaminated the fuel.
113
 The judge found that the 
crew-members were unseaworthy, ‘this is a shocking history of feer 
inefficiency, a succession of negligent acts amounting, in my opinion, to a 
state of efficiency far beyond casual negligence.’114  
 
5.2 Privity and Due Diligence to 
Seaworthy Crew 
In determining due diligence as to crew competence, factors the court took 
into account were certificates, knowledge of the individual crew-member, 
previous accidents and information and training provided. Relevant factors 
in assessing privity were knowledge of the individual and experts opinions. 
 
Following that certificates doesn´t ensure actual competence, due diligence 
is not met by proving solely that certificates has been viewed. Similarly, that 
they are not certified doesn´t mean the ship-owner has failed to exercise due 
diligence or is privy to unseaworthiness. Genuine knowledge of the 
individual gained by previous employment or comprehensive interviews and 
back-ground checks is necessary.  
 
In Marina Iris, the ship-owner was not privy to the crews incompetence. 
The ship-owner knew the crew-members were uncertified but the judge 
determined that their competence could be trusted as they had worked 
satisfactorily for the company on other routes and an expert opined that they 
were competent for the voyage.
115
 Relevant for the courts determination was 
that an expert accepted by the insurers had ensured seaworthiness prior to 
voyage.
116
 
 
In Makedonia, due diligence had not been exercised as to the crew-members 
competence. One engineer had been employed without proper proceedings, 
two men had approached the employer and sought the position as chief-
engineer. After looking at the certificates of competence, the one with the 
longest experience was employed without ensuring neither general nor ship-
specific competence. No interviews were made and previous employer´s 
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weren´t contacted. No control was made regarding the engineers knowledge 
on use of fuel handling on the particular ship and no plan was provided to 
inform him how it worked.
117
 
 
To ensure that the crew-members are competent doesn´t mean only 
employing competent crew. Due diligence is to detect where crew-members 
lack knowledge and provide training tools or guidelines to ensure they gain 
it in time for the voyage or at the relevant part of the voyage. 
 
Both Eurasean Dream and the Star Sea were unseaworthy inter alia due to 
the masters not knowing how to handle the fire-fighting systems and in both 
cases the ship-owner had failed to inquire whether they had adequate 
knowledge or provided adequate information. The difference were that the 
former was a claim under a BOL and the latter an insurance claim. In the 
Eurasean dream the ship-owner had failed to exercise due diligence because 
of this. An Emergency Procedural Manual containing information on the 
fire-fighting system but it was too voluminous and not fitted for the 
vessel.
118
 In the Star Sea the ship-owner were not held privy to 
seaworthiness because evidence was adduced that the assured sincerely 
trusted the masters competence, he had long experience working for the 
company with a good record of service and held a master certificate.
119
 
5.3 Vessel and Equipment 
If a ship is not strong enough or properly equipped for the intended voyage, 
the vessel is unseaworthy. Factors courts took into account in determining 
seaworthiness were nature of defect, functionality and industry standards. 
 
Whether a vessel and equipment is seaworthy or not goes down to 
functionality, if it is fit to meet expected perils. One of the reasons Star Sea 
was unseaworthy was that the engine room sealing didn´t work properly.
120
 
Toledo broke down during voyage in harsh weather conditions after the 
vessel started taking in water through a cracked shell. Justice Clarke 
concluded causative unseaworthiness at the beginning of the voyage 
because of the nature of the defect as the internal structure was not fit to 
withstand expected stress-exposure during voyage.
121
 
 
The Eurasean Dreams was unseaworthy for many reasons, inter alia for 
neither being equipped with enough walkie-talkies for the crew to 
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communicate adequately in an emergency situation nor with enough 
breathing apparatus for the vessel despite following IMO standards.
122
 
5.4 Privity and Due Diligence to 
Seaworthy Vessel and Equipment 
In assessing due diligence, courts has considered knowledge of the vessel, 
industry practice, proper reporting systems. In assessing privity to 
unseaworthiness, actual knowledge, expert opinions and classification 
society’s certificates were considered. 
 
Class certificates and completed class surveys are indications that the vessel 
is seaworthy, but classification societies are not expected to maintain better 
knowledge than the ship-owner about the condition of vessel or equipment 
as due diligence is a non-delegable duty. The ship-owners were held not to 
have exercised due diligence to Toledo´s seaworthiness. The unsea-
worthiness, the weak internal structure, arose after frequently being 
damaged by stevedores and the fact that the ship-owner hadn´t repaired 
them.
123
 The judge found that a prudent ship-owner at the relevant time 
would have appreciated the risk and would have an adequate system for 
‘inspection, ascertainment and repair.’124  
 
Toledo´s ship-owner argued that due diligence had been exercised, the 
vessel was in class, it had been surveyed regularly and industry practice was 
followed.
 
Justice Clarke accepted that the industry practice was not to repair 
these damages but found that ship-owners should have been aware that they 
needed to be repaired because of previous accidents and that others 
negligence doesn’t cure this ship-owners negligence.125 In response to the 
vessel being in class and class-recommendations being followed,
126
 the 
judge merely acknowledged that if classification society had known about 
the major damages, they would have recommended reparation.
127
 
 
In the Lydia Flag it was alleged that the ship-owner hadn´t provided an 
adequate reporting system and the crew-members therefore had not reported 
that the rudder was lose, it was neglected on the bases that a failure to report 
may either be caused by inadequate reporting systems or by negligent 
crew.
128
 
 
The Star Sea was unseaworthy inter alia due to the engine room sealing 
didn´t work properly. The assured was not privy to such unseaworthiness, 
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he reasonably trusted it was in a good condition as she was surveyed and 
maintained safety certificates.
129
 
5.5 Conclusion Seaworthiness in Case-
law 
In courts assessment of crew-competence emphasis is placed on competence 
showed by experience specific to the voyage. If a crew-member is on a ship 
he has never been before or undertakes a longer trip then before he must 
acquire special training or get guidance to become competent. If he is on a 
vessel he has served on before, and has kept a good record of service, he 
will most likely be deemed competent despite making a mistake on one 
voyage. 
 
For vessel and equipment to be deemed seaworthy, greatest reliance was put 
on not containing any defects and that the equipment is adequate for the 
particular vessel.  
 
Due diligence as to seaworthiness has been exercised if the ship-owner has 
taken into account all relevant information he should reasonably have access 
to, ensured seaworthy crew, vessel and equipment are obtained and 
maintained and that all defects and deficiencies are corrected. In order to 
ensure this ship-owner must take into account regulations, industry practise, 
expert opinions and finally assess what needs to be complied with and what 
additional measures must be taken to make his vessel seaworthy for the ship 
and the voyage.  
 
Privity, or blind eye knowledge is a very high standard and will depend on 
available information in each case. Knowing that a crew-member is 
uncertified or a vessel is certified from a country of convenience doesn´t 
amount to privity to unseaworthiness if other factors show seaworthiness.  
 
Conclusively, the factors courts placed greatest reliance on in determining 
seaworthiness was crew-members experience and vessel´s and equipment´s 
functionality.  For due diligence as to seaworthiness relevant factors for 
crew-members were knowledge of the individual and his skills gained by 
assessing previous experience and for vessel and equipment how the defects 
manifested themselves and objective standards. Privity to unseaworthiness 
was not found in the assessed cases but the court found the ship-owners not 
being privity to crew-members incompetence for knowing the crew-member 
and trusting expert opinions and certificates and for vessel and equipment 
after the vessel being in class. 
 
The factors the courts didn´t place such great reliance on were certificates 
and compliance with laws and regulations, because they were not spot on 
the negligent act, in other words, had they had the certificates they would 
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not have acted differently. Ship-owners cannot trust certificates or 
information from third parties to escape due diligence because it is a non-
delegable duty and the ship-owner is expected to know his ship best. 
 
5.6 Objective Standards a Court will take 
into Account  
Based on what objective standards a court didn´t take into account, it could 
be inferred that a standard that is specific to the vessel and the hazards, 
contain substantive specific requirements, ensure actual knowledge and is 
reasonable will be considered. 
 
The next section will present IMO instruments for piracy and polar 
navigation and analyse on the bases of the above findings whether one 
contain more adequate information for a seaworthiness assessment than the 
other. 
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6 IMO Guidelines on Piracy, 
Harsh Weather Conditions 
and Ice 
6.1 IMO and Piracy 
IMO does not work by themselves to combat piracy but cooperates with 
numerous organisations throughout the industry. The ultimate goal is to 
abolish all piracy by establishing effective government and implement the 
rule of law ashore in Somalia. Meanwhile piracy still exist, the focus is to 
protect ships and those on board from piracy attacks.130 
6.2 Best Management Practices for 
Protection against Somali Based 
Piracy 
The BMP is the result of cooperation throughout the maritime industry 
providing practical guidelines on how to avoid, deter and delay piracy 
attacks. IMO has acknowledged the guidelines and urged member states to 
ensure that owners, operators and managers of ships entitled to fly their flag, 
as well as the shipboard personnel employed or engaged on such ships 
comply with the guidelines.
131
 The guidelines are not mandatory nor subject 
to certification. Furthermore, it is emphasised that it is just basic measures 
that ship-owners are invited to go beyond.
132
 The factors concerned include 
inter alia route planning, crew training and ship construction. The main 
advice is that the best way to avoid a pirate attack is to not be near pirates. 
 
Ship-operators and masters are recommended to carry out a ‘ship- and 
voyage specific’ risk-assessment before entering the high-risk area to 
identify measures for prevention, mitigation and recovery, which will mean 
combining statutory regulations with supplementary measures to combat 
piracy.
133
  
 
The high-risk area is under constant surveillance and reports on locations of 
pirate activity are provided. Masters are advised to review this information 
and re-route if necessary. Group Transit Schemes are provided, where ships 
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travel in convoy through the high risk area, which the master is advised to 
join.
134
 
 
Masters are recommended to conduct crew-training sessions prior to transits 
in the high-risk areas ensuring that the crew is fully briefed and familiar 
with their duties in the event of a piracy-attack.
135
 Physical barriers such as 
water spray are effective to impede boarding.
136
 At the time the guidelines 
were issued, 2011, there had been no reported attacks where pirates have 
boarded a ship that has been proceeding at over 18 knots and vessels are 
therefore recommended to proceed in full speed in the High Risk Area.
137
 
6.3 IMO, Harsh Weather Conditions and 
Ice 
IMO are working on a mandatory Polar Code that is expected to be finalized 
in 2015/2016.
138
 The Polar Code covers both Arctic and Antarctica and 
includes parts of the Northern Sea Route. In awaiting the Polar Code, the 
non-mandatory ‘Guidelines for ships operating in Polar waters’ 139 have 
been introduced. The Guidelines are recommendatory and their wording 
should be interpreted as providing recommendations rather than mandatory 
direction.
140
  
6.4 Guidelines for Ships operating in 
Polar Waters 
The Polar Guidelines consists of 16 chapters canvassing construction, 
equipment, operational matters and environmental protection.
141
 Provisions 
are included for risk assessment, route planning, crew competence and ship 
construction.  
 
Operations in polar waters should take due account of factors such as: ship 
class, environmental conditions, icebreaker escort, prepared tracks, short or 
local routes, crew experience, support technology and services such as ice-
mapping, availability of hydrographic information, communications, safe 
ports, repair facilities and other ships in convoy.
142
 Consideration should 
also be given to carrying an Ice-Navigator when planning voyages into polar 
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waters.
143
Continuous monitoring of ice conditions by an Ice-Navigator 
should be available at all times while the ship is underway and making way 
in the presence of ice.
144
 
 
All ships operating in polar ice-covered waters should carry at least one 
qualified Ice-Navigator
145
 with documentary evidence of having 
satisfactorily completed an approved training program in ice navigation and 
appropriate on-the-job training that may include simulation training.
146
 The 
Ice-Navigator should have knowledge, understanding and proficiency of 
required for operating a ship in polar ice-covered waters, including 
recognition of ice formation and characteristics; ice indications; ice 
maneuvering; use of ice forecasts, atlases and codes; hull stress caused by 
ice; ice escort operations; ice-breaking operations and effect of ice accretion 
on vessel stability 
 
The guidelines recommend due consideration to comply with Polar Class in 
accordance with the International Association of Classification Societies or 
alike designation should they travel in polar waters where ice is prevalent. 
There are 7 different Polar Classes ranging from PC 1, year round in all ice-
covered waters to PC 7, summer/autumn operation in thin first-year ice 
which may include old ice inclusions.
147
  
 
The guidelines stressed that structures, equipment and arrangements 
essential for the safety and operation of the ship should take account of 
anticipated temperatures.
148
 All ships should have structural arrangements 
adequate to resist the global and local iceloads characteristic of their Polar 
Class5.
149
 Each area of the hull and all appendages should be strengthened to 
resist design structure/ice interaction scenarios applicable to each case.
150
All 
Polar Class ships should be able to withstand flooding resulting from hull 
penetration due to ice impact.
151
 
6.5 Comparison 
The guidelines are similar in that they both require risk-assessment to be 
carried out to the respective hazards and constant attention to ensure the 
hazards hasn´t change. None of them are mandatory although the Polar 
guidelines have a more mandatory approach than the BMP that holds a more 
informative approach.  
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Polar guidelines provide that the ship must be supplied with an Ice-
Navigator with particular training evidenced by documentation. The BMP 
doesn´t require a person with special knowledge, however it requires all 
crew-members to be briefed before entering the high-risk area so that all 
know what to do in the event of an attack. 
 
Considering ship and equipment, the Polar guidelines are also 
comprehensive and detailed containing substantial requirements and 
compliance with class. The BMP informs what ships are best suitable to 
avoid an attack but doesn´t require ships to be reconstructed but that they 
take additional measures in order to not be attacked. In respect of ship and 
equipment, the Polar guidelines also contain detailed requirements whereas 
the BMP are concerned that any vessel should deter a piracy attack. 
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7 Analysis 
The analysis will be based on information and findings from the previous 
sections. It has been concluded that only objective standards that are 
reasonable and directly relevant for the casualty are referred to in the courts 
seaworthiness or due diligence to seaworthiness claims. It has also been 
concluded that objective standards are acknowledged by court to evidence a 
ship-owner is not privy to unseaworthiness and that if there are no available 
objectives standards, the court will look at the nature of the deficiency. If 
the ship-owner could not reasonable have known the vessel was not fit to 
meet the hazard, or that there was a new hazard, the vessel is seaworthy and 
the ship-owner has exercised due diligence to seaworthiness. 
 
The factors that will be considered in the analysis are the guidelines in the 
IMO context, evidence of compliance and type of requirements relevant for 
casual connection. 
 
The legal status of IMO instruments may be considered and it is argued that 
greater reliance is placed on mandatory rules than recommendations. 
Neither the Polar Code nor the BMP are mandatory. The Polar Guidelines 
are introduced awaiting a partially mandatory Code, they are written in a 
mandatory language using words as shall and contains detailed 
requirements. In effect it seems mandatory rather than recommendatory. 
 
The status of BMP is different, they present best management practices and 
there are no indications that any of it will be mandatory in the future, 
adjectives used are recommends and informs and has no mandatory 
character. The BMP is in fact not an IMO instrument, it was made by 
cooperation throughout the industry and IMO merely acknowledged them 
and spread them to their member states. The reasons why the Polar 
guidelines and BMP should be acknowledge differs, but it seems plausible 
that in both cases, a judge that got them in his hands would acknowledge 
them and accept them as providing industry standards. 
 
First time a casualty happens, the ship-owner is excused, but he must ensure 
it doesn´t happen again. The BMP are written in response to pirate attacks 
and recommendations are based on what has worked previously. If an 
accident occurs and all BMP are complied with it may be that pirates have 
introduced new techniques and the casualty occurred for the first time and 
the ship-owner is hence freed. The Polar Guidelines on the other hand are 
anticipatory, they are based on calculations and hypothetical and not real 
accidents. Their relevance in a court assessment can therefore be questioned. 
It would therefore seem more plausible in a seaworthiness assessment that 
the BMP are followed than the Polar guidelines. 
 
Documentary evidence or certification is not relevant in proving 
seaworthiness or due diligence as to seaworthiness but it is relevant in 
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proving that the ship-owner is not privy to unseaworthiness. The Polar 
guidelines expects documentary evidence in respect of crew-competence, 
the BMP does not. Thus being a question only of evidence, objective 
standards only serves as evidence in determining privy to unseaworthiness 
which is relevant for the outcome of the case. The Polar guidelines are 
therefore more adequate than the BMP. 
 
Considering the BMP and the Polar Code in regards of formality only, they 
are both of relevance for a courts assessment of seaworthiness and due 
diligence to seaworthiness. Taking into account the factor that the BMP are 
based on response to real accidents, they would seemingly play a greater 
importance in a seaworthiness assessment and if a ship-owner complies with 
them he most probably has done enough to exercise due diligence as to 
seaworthiness. 
 
The Polar guidelines are much more comprehensive than the BMP. They 
contain detailed information in what an Ice-Navigator must know, how a 
ship should be constructed and what equipment should be supplied. The 
Polar guidelines refer to seven different Polar Classes with different 
requirements depending on when and where the vessel travels. More 
objective standards may indicate that more consideration to the casualty and 
the information provided will have casual connection with the accident. It 
could be argued that in more situations will the court find that if the crew-
members have this knowledge, subsequent mistakes would be of negligence 
and not incompetence. The BMP applies similarly to all vessels and there 
are no requirements on hull-strength and alike. It could either mean that it is 
not relevant for the hazard, or that the ship-owner must figure out himself 
whether the vessel is seaworthy or not. The Polar guidelines are therefore 
better for a ship-owner in respect of this factor. But the question is how 
relevant subjective standards are in a seaworthiness assessment. 
 
If the ship is strengthened in accordance with regulations but sinks after 
collision with ice the ship-owner may be found to have exercised due 
diligence to seaworthiness. However, if the ship-hull couldn´t handle it 
because the collision was more severe than anticipated due to the ship 
steaming too fast, that the ship-hull complies with requirements will be 
immaterial in the seaworthiness assessment. 
 
Seaworthiness is assessed based on the ship; equipment and crew as a 
whole, fulfilling all the requirements in the Polar guidelines doesn´t 
guarantee the ship as a whole seaworthy. Also, deficiencies in one aspect 
can be up filled by acknowledging the deficiency and find a way to get 
around it. Although the engine broke down in Hong Kong fir, the 
unseaworthiness didn´t arise from the condition of the engine but for not 
supplying adequate crew. The BMP holds a more holistic view than the 
Polar guidelines. 
 
The BMP informs that no ship travelling faster than 18 knots have 
successfully been attacked by pirates and ships are recommended to travel 
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in fast speed. Ships that have a slower maximum speed are not 
recommended not to travel in the area, but they are instead recommended to 
travel in convoy. It is doubtful that a ship travelling in a convoy would be 
argued unseaworthy for slow-steaming. 
 
Conclusively, both the BMP and the Polar Guidelines are hazard specific 
and should therefore be acknowledged by courts in the subsequent claims. 
 
In assessing seaworthiness and due diligence to seaworthiness, a ship-owner 
having complied with the BMP are most likely considered to have exercised 
due diligence to make his ship seaworthy, the same is not true in regards of 
the Polar guidelines. The BMP are based on previous accidents and deal 
with the adventure as a whole. The Polar guidelines are more 
comprehensive but compliance with each requirement doesn´t necessarily 
means the ship is seaworthy in its entirety. This is in line with the ISM Code 
gaining recognition in courts assessment for providing practical rather than 
legal standards.  
 
Although the ship may be rendered unseaworthy, what is of importance in 
an insurance dispute is whether the ship-owner is privity to such 
unseaworthiness or not. The Polar guidelines contain specific and detailed 
information and issues certificates to show compliance and are therefore 
more suitable evidence than the BMP in an insurance claim. 
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8 Conclusion 
The insurer is liable to indemnify the ship-owner unless he can prove that 
the vessel was seaworthy and the ship-owner was privity to such 
unseaworthiness. Whether a vessel is unseaworthy or not is based on 
objective standards, but whether a ship-owner is privy is purely subjective. 
Nevertheless, certificates proving objective standards are met can evidence 
that the ship-owner is not privy. 
 
In a cargo-claim under a BOL the ship-owner must prove he has exercised 
due diligence to seaworthiness in order to be allowed to rely on any 
immunity from liability for the cargo-loss. The test is the one of the prudent 
ship-owner in the particular ship-owners shoes. Objective standards should 
be met, but cannot relief the ship-owner if he ought to have known 
additional measures were needed for the particular vessel and adventure.  
 
The Polar guidelines are more detailed and comprehensive and certificates 
are issued to prove compliance in respect of the crew and the vessel. From a 
ship-owner perspective, the Polar Guidelines are more suitable in an 
insurance claim because they contain detailed requirements and compliance 
is evidenced by documents so the ship-owner can prove that he was not 
privy to any unseaworthiness.  
 
The BMP are better suited in a claim under a BOL. They are holistic and 
based on real accidents. If a ship-owner can show he complies with these he 
can show that he has exercised due diligence to seaworthiness in respect of 
piracy. 
 
Because only one route can be chosen, the advise would be for the ship-
owner to travel the Southern Route because it is easier to defend against 
being privy to seaworthiness than proving having exercised due diligence to 
seaworthiness. 
 
However, whether a court will find a vessel seaworthy or unseaworthy is 
very difficult to predict, it can relate to any aspect of the crew, equipment 
and vessel. A vessel damaged after a pirate attack may be rendered 
seaworthy in respect of being prepared for the attack but may be rendered 
unseaworthy in regards of a general aspect.  
 
Conclusively, it is not advisable to place too much reliance on the aspect of 
providing a vessel the court will deem seaworthy in choosing whether to 
travel the Northern Sea Route or the Southern Route between Asia and 
Europe. 
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